August-September 2017

Cuba in Angola: an old and lucrative business of the Castros

Recently it was reported that Angola had rejected the services of 189 Cuban medical “collaborators” (workers). It seems unusual within the framework of “fraternal ties” between the African country and Cuban for more than four decades. No cause has been given, but it can be surmised from Angola’s difficulties in keeping up with payments for the services.

After the Cuban military intervention in Angola ended (1975-1991), the “collaboration” seems to have resurfaced in 2007, when 60 Cuban doctors (surgeons, pediatricians and other specialists) were sent to Angola. Cuba's export services to Angola then grew under successive agreements surrounding top-level exchanges, beginning with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos official visit to Cuba in September 2007. At the time, Angola, the second largest oil producer on the African continent, was reaping abundant oil revenues. Angola soon began to pay the financial price of falling oil prices, yet the number of Cuban workers there grew significantly. In 2013, 47 water experts, 219 educators and 800 Cuban doctors were reportedly working in Angola, and the Cuban medical teams were composed of a physician, statistician, and a nursing specialist providing assistance in 70 municipalities. In mid-2014, it was reported that 4,000 Cuban collaborators were in Angola — 1,800 in health and 1,400 in education — and that 1,779 Angolans were in Cuba studying for their university degrees, especially in medicine. (It is understood that the Angolan government pays Cuba for all these services.)

In 2015, problems surfaced. It was announced that Angola’s defaults had led to a decision to terminate the services of at least some of the 4,000 Cuban workers, but that the order had been annulled.

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5 Cuba to sell water expertise to South Africa, China, Cuba Standard, Sep. 9, 2013.
6 La educación en Cuba: mito y futuro, Agencias, martinoticias.com, Nov. 21, 2013.
8 “Colabora Cuba con la salud en 70 municipios de Angola,” Luanda, 4 oct 2013 (RHC-AIN).
9 Dos Santos llega a Cuba para reunirse con Raúl Castro, Diario de Cuba, La Habana, Jun. 17, 2014.
thereafter, the director of the Americas Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Angola, Francisco José Da Cruz, acknowledged that “adjustments” were being made because “we have financial delays in Angola due to the abrupt fall in oil prices in the international market.”

The Cuban government was also seeking to curb the self-employment of Cuban workers in Angola. A filtered report from Cuba’s Ministry of Health (MINSAP) indicated that an increase in Cuban doctors to Angola had been halted “pending specific measures by the Angolan side to discourage individual recruitment in private clinics and Institutions.” Among other things, the document reiterated that Cuban workers in Angola were under the terms of Cuba’s Labor Code, whose lack of protection of workers’ rights is well known. Cuba’s health authorities had already issued 18 directives to prevent the independent hiring of Cuban doctors overseas or, at all costs, to have it happen through the Cuban state enterprise Comercializadora de Servicios Médicos; among the recommendations was to retrieve at the airport all passports of “collaborators” arriving on vacation or upon completing their mission and to punish any violation of the legal requirements for leaving the country by disqualifying doctors from working in Cuba or demoting them to inferior positions.

On the other hand, the press amply reported that the Angolan oil company Sonangol would start drilling in two blocks (M23 and N33) contracted in Cuba’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Angola and Cuba were probably counting on new oil revenues to pay for Cuba’s services, but since no subsequent media announcements can be found, it appears results were disappointing. It appears that the oil-for-services scheme Cuba has used with Venezuela is part of the deal with Angola—in February 2017, martinoticias.com reported from a confidential source that Cuba exchanged medical personnel for oil from Angola.

At the beginning of 2016, it was clear that Angola continued having problems with its payments. A digital news site published a letter from Angolan students with scholarships to Cuba denouncing the “very serious situation” from the excessive delay (almost 8 months) in the payment of their stipend by the National Institute of Management of Scholarships of Studies of Angola; the “extremely difficult circumstances” had led 15 students to return home. Months later, the problem continued, with

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13 Augusto César San Martín, “La solidaridad médica se paga y bien,” Cuba Net, Jul. 21, 2015
14 Cuba violates conventions of the International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) it has ratified, regarding freedom of association, collective bargaining, protection of wages, and prohibitions on forced labor and imposes severe legal restrictions of worker rights, including the denial of the right to strike, job loss and the denial of job opportunities for political beliefs and for trying to depart the country, disallowing the formation of independent trade unions, and only recognizing the Communist Party-controlled Workers’ Central Union of Cuba (CTC). (Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017; The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016.)
16 Una nota de EFE en el 2017 hace una breve referencia a que la empresa española Repsol, la malaya PC Gulf, la rusa Gazpromneft, la angoleña Sonangol y PDVSA de Venezuela ya habían intentado sin éxito la prospección petrolera en la Zona Económica Exclusiva de Cuba. (“Cuba busca capital extranjero para relanzar proyectos de prospección petrolera,” La Habana, EFE, Aug. 2, 2017.)
Angolan students in Russia and Portugal denouncing similar problems. The Cuban government, meanwhile, was apparently not offering a hand to the Angolan students in Cuba suffering “despair, debts, hunger, stress, and other hardships.”

In June of that year (2016), the Cuban ambassador to Angola revealed that health workers, including doctors, had returned to Cuba due to non-payment, but that the problem had been resolved and they were already returning. That November, the official Cuban press reported that 3,023 Cubans were providing services in Angola in health, education, and construction (repairing roads, bridges, and airports in several provinces) under contract with the Cuban company Corporación Antillana Exportadora (Antex, S.A.) and that 2,386 Angolans were in Cuba studying for degrees in different subjects; in addition, “cooperation” programs were cited in other areas such as electricity, water resources, and fisheries. Then, in May 2017, it was reported that the Angolan government had hired the Cuban company Imbondex to rehabilitate roads in the province of Bengo for almost 277 million euros. However, on August 10, 2017, information was filtered that Angola had rejected 189 Cuban health workers (doctors, dentists, nurses, and other professionals) who were ready to leave for Angola under the auspices of Antex, S.A. Regardless of continuing declarations of brotherhood and solidarity, it’s clear that Cuba’s business with Angola is facing serious difficulties.

How much Angola pays—or is supposed to pay—to the Cuban government for each worker is a state secret. However, the international press has reported that Cuba receives US$5,000 monthly for each doctor, while the doctors, in turn, are paid only about $125 dollars per month (usually a large part of this compensation accumulates in a fund the worker can only withdraw upon success-fully completing the mission and returning to Cuba). Even this miserable sum is more than the US$60 a month (approximately) that a doctor earns in Cuba. Apart from receiving such meager compensation, Cuban workers are exposed to dangerous and even unknown diseases—in some cases, they endure risky living conditions. Even so, a post in Angola is said to be one of the most desirable. Some Cubans manage to get hired on their own account once there or after completing the mission. Attracted by the high salaries they can obtain without Cuban state mediation, around six thousand are said to have done so—this, despite unstable wages, the incidence of disease, lack of health coverage, and high cost of living (Luanda is the world’s most expensive city for expatriates).

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19 Pedro Borralho Ndomba, Bolseiros angolanos em Cuba e na Rússia sem subsidios, Deutsche Welle (DW), 08/04/2016, http://p.dw.com/p/11SD0.
20 “Bolseiros angolanos em Cuba...” op. cit.
22 Antex, S.A. was created in 1989. (Eileen Sosin Martínez, “Cuba y Angola: negocios son negocios,” OnCubaMagazine.com, 6 octubre, 2014.) Antex is part of the Cuban military conglomerate GAESA and is dedicated to hiring out Cuban personnel overseas. (GAESA: las oscuras finanzas que controlan Cuba, martinoticias.com, Dec. 3, 2012.)
26 “Cuba: If it’s such a health superpower, why have thousands of doctors fled?,” www.thejournal.ie, March 28, 2016.
29 Eileen Sosin Martínez, “El gobierno de Angola...”, op.cit.
Behind the discourse of “humanitarian power” and “internationalist aid,”30 a lot of money from Angola has gone to swell the coffers of the Cuban regime. Today, assuming Angola were paying US$5,000 per Cuban worker per month, Cuba could be invoicing US$15 million a month, or US$180 million annually, just for the 3,023 workers hired out by Antex in 2016, i.e., not counting those sent by other Cuban state companies such as Imbondex. If there are 4,000 workers, as reported, revenues for Cuba could be US$20 million a month, or US$240 million a year. Likewise, grossly estimating income received for the Angolan students in Cuba, if we assumed that all were studying medicine (in fact, it is only the majority) and that each one costs Angola what Panama pays, US$65,000, Angola would be paying around US$155 million for the 2,386 students reportedly in Cuba.

As we have seen, Cuba's “internationalist collaboration” is, in fact, a huge business by the Cuban state based on the trafficking of exploited workers; it also violates international law. (See Cuba Archive's work on this issue at CubaSalud.org.) This modality of modern slavery has for years been the greatest source of revenues for Cuba — currently reported between US$8 and $11 billion annually, or around three times the revenues from tourism. Inevitably, it has been used to sustain repression and to finance international influence and propaganda by a dictatorship that is going on six decades.

The fact is that the Cuban regime under the Castro bothers began long ago using its own people to extract lucrative profits from Angola.

The Cuban intervention in Angola (1975-1991)

In 1975, Fidel Castro launched “Operation Carlota” – according to official figures from Havana it would take 377,033 military personnel and over 50,000 civilian aid workers from Cuba during the 16 years it lasted (1975-1991).31 The official explanation for the Cuban intervention was that self-proclaimed Angolan president Agosthino Neto, a historical communist and ally of the USSR, had requested military aid from Cuba. The truth was otherwise. A former senior intelligence official of Cuba confirms that the Soviet Union (USSR) - which supported Cuba with billions of dollars a year - asked Fidel Castro to send the Cuban military force, promising to pay for all the war material. Portugal had initiated a process for the independence of its colonies in Africa and the USSR, seeking to bring Angola into the Soviet orbit by consolidating Neto in power, found it inconvenient for the USSR to appear as the invading force.32 In the Cold War scenario, the USSR supported Neto’s MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the SWAPO (South African People’s Organization), that was fighting for Namibia's independence, while the United States and South Africa supported UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola).

30 “Destaca Angola sus relaciones…”, op.cit.
32 Enrique Garcia, a former senior official of Cuba’s DGI (General Directorate of Intelligence) who defected in 1989 says Fidel Castro confirmed to his Political Bureau that the Kremlin had asked Cuba to send the military force to Angola, guaranteeing that the USSR would provide the military equipment. (Interview, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Aug. 21, 2017.)
Cuba did not act out in sheer revolutionary solidarity, it actually received payment for its services, an estimated US$300 to US$ 600 million annually,\(^{33}\) (representing between US $4.8 and US $9.6 billion in the 16 years of struggle). A Cuban who served in Angola, the engineer Carlos Pedre, obtained testimony from a former FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba) officer for a book he authored on the Angola war that Angola paid Cuba $2,000 per soldier per month.\(^{34}\) Cuba also developed millionaire businesses, managed by its senior FAR officials, through the systematic plunder of ivory, diamonds, and timber from Angola, and diverted to Havana equipment that arrived for factories in Angola.\(^{35}\) It is an open secret that the Cuban military also “stole as much as they could,” including vehicles, and home furnishings, and it is alleged that they were even trafficking drugs.\(^{36}\)

Despite the high revenues Cuba was receiving for its “assistance” to Angola, it did not compensate most soldiers sent there; these were mostly very young recruits serving the obligatory military service, who only received the 7 Cuban pesos a month usually paid to recruits in Cuba. Only officers above the Captain were paid, and only 600 kwanzas, while senior advisers and top officers received 900 to 1,000 kwanzas (one kwanza was equivalent to one U.S. dollar).\(^{37}\) Unlike the officers, the soldiers did not have vacation and they had to serve for three years without returning to Cuba.\(^{38}\) Cuban writer Jorge Olivera Castillo, a veteran of Angola, explains: “Upon returning to Cuba, with the meager amount of money they gave us, we were only able to buy one or two outfits (clothing), perfume of poor quality, and a few items for personal hygiene. After that humiliation came an Olympic forgetfulness.”\(^{39}\)

A large number of Cubans went to Angola on a journey with no return. According to Cuba’s official press, 2,085 died, including 204 civilians - doctors, paramedics, teachers and others.\(^{40}\) However, the Cuban government has never published the official list of fatalities\(^{41}\) and it remains a closely guarded secret. Veterans of the war and certain experts insist that the number of fatalities was much higher. The documentary “Cuba: an African Odyssey,” featuring filmic testimony from the main actors on the Cuban side, states that "military historians agree that at least 10,000 Cubans died in Angola.”\(^{42}\) Already in 1978, the Spanish newspaper *El País* reported that the Central Intelligence

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\(^{38}\) Ibid, op.cit.


\(^{41}\) Blog HavanaLuanda (https://havanaluanda.wordpress.com) published a list of 2,106 Cuban soldiers killed in Angola since 1975, as it appears in the inscriptions at Freedom Park, a monument erected in South Africa for those killed in the border wars in Namibia and Angola. This list was reportedly delivered in 2006 by the Cuban ambassador in South Africa, Esther Armenteros, to Dr. Mongane Wally Serote, administrator of Freedom Park.

Agency (CIA) of the United States estimated that 1,400 Cubans had died in the first four years of Cuban intervention in Angola, an intervention that went on for twelve more years. Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, estimated 6,200 Cuban fatalities in the war up to 1986. According to senior U.S. government officials in 1987, Cuban Brigadier General Rafael del Pino, who had just defected to the U.S., had reported around 10,000 fatalities of Cuban troops in Angola, a figure that coincided with U.S. government estimates. Regardless of the actual number, many died not in combat but in accidents, friendly fire caused by negligence and poor training, or diseases such as malaria and yellow fever; many others committed suicide, unable to withstand the terrible conditions.

Cuba also used its merchant ships to transport troops as well as the sick and wounded, in violation of international rules. They were hidden in the warehouses, in inadequate conditions, for voyages back and forth of 18 to 21 days. This caused even more human suffering and probably the death of many of the sick and injured.

Since the onset of the war, transferring the remains of the dead to Cuba was forbidden. It was not until December 6, 1989, as the end of the conflict was being negotiated, that remains were transferred back to Cuba in the “Operation Tribute.” Each of Cuba’s 169 municipalities held honor burials in special pantheons. War veterans, however, report that most of the fallen in combat were buried right on the spot and doubt that most remains were repatriated. A former combatant, a pilot who served in Angola in 1983, reports that the bodies of the Cubans killed in the Angola were buried without ceremony, unclothed (especially their boots were re-used), and directly on the ground (with no coffins) at a special section of the Alto Las Cruces cemetery in Miramar, Luanda; when that cemetery filled up, another one was created at the end of the airport runway. He was familiar with the forensic work undertaken for the 1989 repatriations but insists that remains also included Cuban “internationalists” fallen in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Algeria, and other countries.

Since there is no official list of the dead or missing and the unofficial lists lack dates and cause of death, Cuba Archive has only been able to register in its database very few documented cases of Cubans killed or missing in Angola (see database. CubaArchive.org). However, among the cases it has documented are examples of the senselessness of many of these tragic losses. For example, Lieutenant Julio Guerra, age 24, a graduate of the flight school in Krasnador in the former USSR, was sent to the war in Angola to fly MIG 23BN aircraft, for which he had little training; in 1987, he disappeared in the jungle and his family never received an explanation of what happened. Raúl Quiala Castañeda had not yet learned how to fly at night when he was ordered to go out in the dark to bomb sites where...
fires were lit near Luanda (indicating the presence of UNITA camps); he crashed and died but his relatives were notified that he had died heroically in combat.

The far-away conflict brought huge revenues to the Castro regime but it cost the Cuban people dearly. Thousands returned from the war mutilated, with psychological trauma, some even went mad. Worse still, veterans of the war complain of the ingratitude with which the government treated them. Today, many are in abject poverty and, according to Olivera Castillo, “many of the beggars and madmen who roam the Cuban streets are veterans of that war.” In addition, during the war, the Cuban population was deprived of health services due to the large number of medical professionals sent to Angola. In sum, as Cuban independent journalist Tania Díaz Castro writes, "On the so-called epic of Angola, we could ask ourselves if it was worth it for a small impoverished, island located 14,000 kilometers from Angola, to be left without those sons, mostly young ones, most of whom fought without knowing why."50

Angola paid a huge cost for the conflict: between 500,000 and one million dead, 3.5 million internally displaced, hundreds of thousands fleeing to neighboring countries like Zaire and Zambia, the rural infrastructure and economy virtually destroyed, the majority of the population impoverished, almost two million faced a famine, and human rights abuses became the norm. The horrific scenario includes war crimes, such as deliberately attacking civilians51/52 and Cuba using chemical weapons against UNITA troops.53 Hundreds of thousands of mines54 were laid across the country and are still in place, causing thousands of deaths and mutilating 80,000 people.55

For what was all this suffering and devastation? Sadly, a quarter century after the end of the Cuban intervention in Angola, Angolans are still subjected to great political repression and economic marginalization.56 The MPLA leaders supported by the Cuban military intervention remain in power, having implanted capitalism under a state monopoly after the fall of the Soviet Union.57 Today, they are among the most corrupt and wealthy rulers in Africa, while the majority of the 29 million Angolans live in poverty.

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51 Cuban general Rafael del Pino, who defected in 1987, describes an attack in 1977 that killed hundreds, especially women and children, when the Cuban General Staff hastily ordered to destroy a village taken by alleged FNLA troops when, in reality, the population was just having a party at the main town square. (Rafael del Pino, Pró a la Libertad, Mexico: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, 1990, p. 228-229.)
52 Chemical weapons are prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In 1988, the United Nations Security Council sent a team of Belgian toxicologists to investigate reports that Cuba had used chemical weapons in Angola. They certified the existence of chemical weapons waste, including sarin and VX gas, in the plants, water and land where Cuban troops were alleged to have thrown them. Further evidence found that other substances, such as napalm, had been used against civilian populations supporting UNITA. (Voix d’Afrique magazine published on February 6, 1990 photos of people, including women and children, deformed by a chemical attack in Angola in the 1980s. (Jonathan T. Stride, “Who will check out Fidel Castro’s new chemical / biological weapons plant in East Havana,” www.fiu.edu/~fct/bio.chem.plnat91097.html)
53 A Cuban helicopter pilot who served Angola in 1983 reports that—in an operation directed by Cuban general Rubén Martínez Puentes—Cuban-manned helicopters were outfitted with two 55-gallon tanks of a napalm (a highly flammable mix prepared with gasoline and liquid soap) that was thrown at civilian populations, entire villages, supportive of UNITA. (M. Werlau, interview with former helicopter pilot, op. cit.)
54 Experts estimate that between 500,000 and 1 million mines were placed, some estimates go as high as several millions. (Adam Mynott, “Angola’s landmine legacy,” BBC, 29 November, 2004.)
55 https://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/africa/angola/